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Introduction
A research puzzle for scholars interested in decision making in the
European Union is the repeated pattern of co-operation in the Council of
Ministers. Research work such as roll-call analysis with regard to voting patterns
in the Council of Ministers has pointed to the overriding “preference for
unanimity”, including in policy sectors which use qualified majority almost
exclusively (Mattila, 1998; Mattila and Lane, 2001; Hayes-Renshaw et al, 2006).
Many different qualitative studies point to the accepted practices, informal rules
or “culture of compromise” which seems to permeate the EU decision process
and the participants involved therein (Hayes-Renshaw et al, 2006; Lewis, 1998;
2005; Heisenberg, 2005). In-depth, detailed descriptions of the EU decision
process point to the extended bargaining activity at work in the EU committees
surrounding the Council of Ministers. Many of these studies describe the
Commission’s proposals being discussed at length in various preparatory and
advisory committees. (Wessels, 1998; Westlake, Galloway et al.,2006). Moreover
the Council of Ministers’ Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)
also provides a central forum for negotiation and amendments to the
Commission’s original proposals, before the final voting stage in the Council of
Ministers (Lewis, 2000).
There is much evidence to suggest that there exists a strong norm of
cooperation in the EU, which seems to guide the collective EU decision process
and in particular restricts the EU member states from engaging in bilateral deals
with each other to the detriment of other EU member states and the Union as a3
whole. (Heritier, 1996 ; Richardson, 1996 ; Jonsson et al, 1998 ; Lewis, 2003;
Schneider et al, 2006). However it is hard to understand why this norm persists in
the EU (Sullivan and Selck, 2007). From the perspective of the EU as a whole, it
makes sense but the EU is a collection of very different member states of
different sizes, resources and sectoral interests. Given this situation, why do
individual member states actually comply with this EU norm and moreover how
does this norm operate as a mechanism of cooperation across the member
states in the EU decision process? Are there conditions when we can expect to
find that member states do not comply with this EU norm of co-operation?
In the present paper we argue that the norm of cooperation between member
states exists and is sustainable, because the configuration of members’ positions
and interests gives rise to a decision situation that resembles a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. We thus argue that it is actually rational for individual member states to
comply with the norm of cooperation, since not doing so would mean large
forgone gains in the future. We make the argument precise and test its
implications by making use of two current models of collective decision making,
namely the Position Exchange Model (PEM) of Stokman and van Oosten (1994)
and the Externalities Exchange Model of Dijkstra et al. (2008). The remainder of
the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we expound our theoretical
argument and derive our hypotheses. The subsequent section describes the data
used to test the hypotheses, the results of which are discussed in the section
after that. The paper is concluded with a discussion of the results and their
implications.4
Theory and Hypotheses
The ‘norm of cooperation’ described in the introduction means that actors
abstain from maximizing their immediate self-interests in the EU decision making
process. This implies that potentially profitable deals are not consumated, for
instance out of fear of upsetting other actors not included in a particular deal. The
question now arises why member states of the EU, would adhere to such a norm
that runs counter to their self-interests. To answer this question we take a
rational choice stance, assuming that actors in the long run do seek to maximze
their self-interests. From this perspective, actors adherring to the norm of
cooperation abstain from the realization of their immediate, short-term goals only
in order to gain something more valuable (or to prevent even larger losses) in the
future.
According to Axelrod’s well-known Cooperation Theory (Axelrod 1984) such
cooperative behavior can be sustained if at least two criteria are met, namely: (i)
the interaction is characterized by a prisoner’s dilemma-like (PD) payoff
structure, and (ii) the interaction horizon is sufficiently long. Point (ii) means that
there must be a sufficiently high probability that actors will interact repeatedly in
the future. It is self-evident that this is characteristic of EU decision making
processes, where every member country expects to remain a member in the
forseeable future. The way in which point (i) is applicable to collective decision
making is less self-evident and is the topic of this section.5
A social situation has a PD-like payoff structure when individually rational
behavior leads to collectively undesirable outcomes (Dawes 1980). Thus, the
basic proporty of such situations is that if all actors pursue their self-interests all
will be worse off compared to the situation where actors abstain from the pursuit
of their self-interests. The problem however is that, given what others do, any
individual actor is always better off pursuing his self-interests. Hence a social
dilemma. In terms of the EU decision making process considered in this paper
this means that an actor is always better off (at least in the short-run) pursuing
his self-interests, even when all other actors adhere to the norm of cooperation.
The principal argument of Cooperation Theory (Axelrod 1984) is that
cooperative behavior (i.e., actors refraining from realizing their immediate self-
interests) can nonetheless be sustained, if the shadow of the future (i.e., the
likelihood that the same actors will repeatedly interact again) is long enough. The
idea is that all actors can threaten to retaliate an ‘act of selfishness’ of any
individual actor (i.e., this actor pursuing his immediate self-interest to the
detriment of the other actors) by withholding their cooperation with that particular
actor (or with every actor for that matter) in future interactions. Moreover, since
pursuing their short-term self-interests is itself an equilibrium strategy (i.e., it is
the best thing actors can do when everybody else does it too), this threat to
withhold future cooperation is credible (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). The
credibility of this threat is exactly what makes it effective: no actor will want to
break the cooperative pattern since doing so will destroy cooperation forever.6
And with no cooperation everybody, including the actor contemplating breaking
the cooperative pattern, is worse off.
In order to apply Cooperation Theory to EU decision making we need to
define exactly what it means for member states to pursue their immediate self-
interests or to abstain from it. In order to do so, we introduce two models of
collective decision making called the Position Exchange Model (PEM; Stokman
and van Oosten 1994; Thomson et al. 2006)
2 and the Externalities Exchange
Model (EEM; Dijkstra et al. 2008). We will argue that we can use the PEM as a
model for the situation where every member state strictly pursues its short-term
self-interests, while the EEM models the situation where all member states
adhere to the norm of cooperation.
The PEM and EEM model collective decision making as decision making
about controversial issues with single peaked preference functions, as most well-
known models do (Black 1958; Bueno de Mesquita, Newman & Ravushka 1985;
Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman 1994; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis & Garrett
1996, and many others). Decision making may well require simultaneous
decisions on several issues. In these cases, different issues should represent
independent controversial elements of the decision making situation and as a set
should cover the full range of possible outcomes. The dynamics in the decision
making process result from actors, with different intensity and potential, trying to
realize their preferred outcome on an issue (their initial position), whereas per
issue only one outcome that is binding for all actors can be chosen. In a complex
2 For a short overview of the application of various bargaining models, including PEM, to EU
decision making, see Sullivan and Selck (2007).7
situation, possibly involving many actors and issues, actors will try to build a
coalition as large as possible behind their initial positions or behind a position
that is as close as possible to this. This informal bargaining process can be seen
as proceeding formal decision making and affecting the final positions of the
actors in the decision making, aiming at a collective outcome that reflects their
interests as much as possible.
The PEM and EEM assume the same structure of collective decision making.
It is assumed that there exists a finite set M of controversial issues, which can
each be represented by a one-dimensional interval scale. These issues are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., an actor can take a position on one
issue, irrespective of his position on other issues (mutual exclusiveness), and the
issues together cover the entire collective decision problem (exhaustiveness). It
is further assumed that each actor n from the finite set of actors N, takes a
position, nm x , on the scale of each issue m, representing n’s most preferred
outcome of m. Furthermore, each actor n is assumed to have a salience, nm s , for
each issue m, expressing the relative importance of issue m to the actor n.
Finally, each actor n has a capability, n c , reflecting n’s potential to affect the final
outcome of each of the issues in M. The actors’ positions, saliences and
capabilities are assumed to be common knowledge. Based on this common
knowledge, all actors are supposed to have a common expected outcome, m O , of
each issue m. In both the PEM and EEM, m O is assumed to be the weighted
average of the actors’ positions, with weights equal to the actors’ capabilities











The basic idea of the PEM is that pairs of actors can mutually increase their
utilities compared to their utilities of the expected outcome in (1) by exchanging
their positions on pairs of issues. The PEM assumes that actors have single-
peaked preferences: an actor’s initial position on an issue represents his
preferred outcome, and any deviation of the final outcome from it, is evaluated as
strictly worse. In the PEM the utility of actor n ( n U ) over the outcomes of all the
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Equation (2) shows that an actor’s utility is assumed to be (i) additive over all
issues, and (ii) decreasing linearly in the absolute distance of the outcome from





In the PEM, two actors are able to exchange on a pair of issues only if they
have positions on opposing sides of the expected outcomes on both issues. With
two issues, and their expected outcomes, we can partition the set of actors into
four groups, A, B, C, and D, as is shown in Figure 1. Members of group A are on
the left hand side of the expected outcomes on the interval scales of both issues,
those of group D are on the right side of both issues. Members of group B are on9
the left hand side of the expected outcome on issue 1, and on the right hand side
on issue 2, with members of C having opposite positions. From this it
immediately follows that according to the PEM members of A can only exchange
with members of D, and members of B can only exchange with members of C.
Exchange between two actors is profitable only if the actors have different
relative saliences for the two relevant issues. Without loss of generality, assume
two actors, i and j, and two issues, 1 and 2. Assume i and j are on opposite sides
of the expected outcomes of issues 1 and 2. Denote the changes in the expected
outcomes on issues 1 and 2, caused by position shifts of actors i and j, as 1  and












































) is in between the relative saliences (see Dijkstra et al. 2008
for a proof). If (3) holds, i shifts his position on issue 1 in the direction of j,
whereas j shifts his position on issue 2 in the direction of i. Issue 1 is then called
the supply issue of i and the demand issue of j, whereas issue 2 is the demand
issue of i and the supply issue of j. If (4) holds, issue 2 is the supply issue of i and
issue 1 is the supply issue of j. The latter situation is depicted in Figure 1.10
In the PEM all possible bilateral exchanges are determined for each pair of
issues from M. For each of these exchanges, position shifts are determined such
that the utility gains of the exchange partners are equal and at a maximum. The
exchanges are then listed in the order of the size of the utility gains. The
exchange with the highest utility gains is then executed, and all other possible
exchanges involving one or both of the partners of this first exchange, and in
which these partners use the same supply issues as in this first exchange, are
deleted from the list. This process is then repeated with the remaining exchanges
on the list, until the list is empty. Then, (1) is applied to all issues with the new
actor positions, and these are the predictions of the PEM. See Stokman and Van
Oosten (1994) for details.
Thus, the PEM is based on the process whereby pairs of actors engage in
position exchanges when such an exchange is mutually profitable. However,
equations (1) and (2) immediately show that an exchange between any pair of
actors will affect the utility of all other actors. This is true because position shifts
of the two exchanging actors will affect the expected outcome, according to (1).
According to (2) this will affect the utility of all actors, whether or not they are a
partner to the exchange. Such utility effects for actors not involved in the
exchange are called externalities, and can be either positive or negative. In the
case of positive externalities, bilateral deals cause decision outcomes to become
better for other actors not involved in the deal, whereas in the case of negative
externalities, decision outcomes become worse for actors not involved in the11
deal. Moreover, one particular bilateral deal can have positive externalities for
some actors and negative externalities for others.
Once more consider Figure 1. It shows how the position exchange of actors i
and j causes the expected outcome (according to equation (1)) to shift away from
the positions of actors in group C on both issues. Thus, actors in this group
experience negative externalities from the exchange between i and j. Actors in
group B, however, experience positive externalities from this exchange, since the
expected outcomes on both issues shift toward their positions. For actors in
groups A and D externalities can be either positive or negative, depending on
how their relative saliences compare to the exchange rate that i and j agree on
(see equations (3) and (4)). See Van Assen et al. (2003) and Dijkstra et al.
(2008) for more elaborate discussions of externalities in collective decision
making.
What is central to the current paper is that the PEM models decision making
as a process of bilateral exchanges on pairs of issues, without taking into
account the positive or negative externalities for other actors. Thus, when actors
in the PEM contemplate the desirability of a potential exchange, they are
assumed to only consider their own utility gains from this exchange, and to
disregard any effects for others. Therefore, the PEM is a plausible model for the
situation in which actors seek to maximize their short-run self-interests.
In the EEM externalities are taken into account. The EEM comes in two
variants, and here we briefly discuss the one in which no negative externalities12
are allowed for any actor. In the current paper, we simply refer to this variant as
the EEM (Dijkstra et al., 2008).
Unlike the PEM, the EEM does not explicitly model position shifts of individual
actors, but directly models the shifts in the expected outcomes of the pair of
issues. In the EEM, equation (1) is computed for each issue and is taken as this
issue’s initially expected outcome. Then, for all possible pairs of issues,
alternative outcomes are sought that constitute a Pareto efficient outcome for all
actors. That is, in the EEM only outcome shifts on pairs of issues are considered
that for all actors yield at least as much utility (according to equation (2)) as the
initially expected outcome. In addition, the alternative outcome cannot be
improved for any actor by further shifting on one or both of the issues, without
decreasing the utility of another actor. Thus, in the EEM negative externalities
(compared to the initially expected outcome) for any actor is prohibited, but
positive externalities are allowed.
The Pareto efficient alternatives thus identified (if any) are collected in the set
P. To single out an element from this set the EEM uses the Generalized Nash
Bargaining Solution (GNBS) formulated by Chae and Heidhues (2004). Letting 
denote the pair ) , ( 2 1   of shifts on issues 1 and 2,respectively, the GNBS is the
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The EEM takes as weights the capability of the actors relative to the summed
capability of all the actors. Formally, the weight assigned to actor n’s utility in (5),










If the set P is empty, the EEM identifies the initially expected outcomes
according to (1) as it’s solution. If P contains more elements, a unique solution to
the maximization problem of (5) exists if the utility space is compact and convex.
Dijkstra et al. (2008) show this is true for the model specification at hand. Hence
the EEM model always identifies a unique solution, for any pair of issues.
With more than 2 issues involved, any issue will be part of more than one
issue pair. In that case choices will have to be made concerning which outcome
shifts on which pairs of issues will actually be executed by the model. To make
this choice, the EEM implements the following voting procedure.
(i) Compute (1) for all issues
(ii) Compute the prediction of the EEM for all M(M-1) exchange possibilities
(iii) Actors vote for their most preferred exchange opportunity
(iv) Select from the list of (remaining) issue pairs the one with the highest
weighted votes
(v) Eliminate all issue pairs from the list containing one of the two issues on
which the exchange in (iv) took place
(vi) If the list is not empty after (v), go back to step (iv)
In step (iii) the EEM assumes that each actor votes for that exchange opportunity
in the list that yields him the largest positive utility change. Hence the EEM
excludes strategic voting. In EEM’s voting procedure, an actor’s vote is weighted14
by the capability of the actor, relative to the sum of capabilities of all actors in N.
The exchange with the highest sum of weighted votes is executed first. Actors
vote only once, at the beginning of the process. If there is a tie, one issue pair is
selected at random. In the data analyzed in this paper, such ties did not occur.
With its rules of preventing negative externalities and of considering only
those outcome shifts that imply Pareto efficiency compared to the initially
expected outcomes, the EEM is a plausible model of the situation in which all
actors adhere to the norm of cooperation. Moreover, in its consideration of
outcome shifts on pairs of issues the EEM is similar to the PEM. Thus, we argue
that the PEM and the EEM are two plausible implementations of the two extreme
situations we want to investigate in this paper: the situation where all actors
ruthlessly pursue their self-interest (PEM), and the situation where all actors
adhere to the norm of cooperation (EEM).
Now that we have the PEM and the EEM available, we can make requirement
(i) of Cooperation Theory, that the interaction situations have a PD-like payoff
structure, more precise. First, observe that all the individual bilateral exchanges
modeled by the PEM are mutually profitable for the two exchanging actors. Thus,
as required by a PD payoff structure, completing the available exchanges is
always the best thing an actor can do in the short run, regardless of what the
other actors do (i.e., whether or not they comply with the norm of cooperation).
However, when all actors follow their immediate self-interests (i.e., exchange
according to the PEM) this might entail large negative externalities for all actors.
The decision situation would resemble a PD payoff structure if these negative15
externalities would override the utility gains the actors reap from their own
exchanges and possibly from positive externalities, compared to the situation
where actors abstained from pursuing their short-term private interests. The latter
situation (adherence to the norm of cooperation) is modeled through the EEM.
Thus, a PD-like payoff structure would exist if all actors would be better off (i.e.,
receive higher utilities according to equation (2)) when the decision making
process followed the EEM procedure than when it followed the PEM procedure.
Indeed, using the same data set that we use in the current paper and comparing
the outcomes predicted by the PEM to the initially expected outcome of equation
(1), Arregui and Stokman (REF) find that for all proposals of the European
Commission, and summed over all member states negative externalities of
exchange outweigh the sum of gains from exchange and positive externalities.
In various studies discussed earlier in this paper, the research presented
there signaled the existence of a norm of cooperation in EU decision making.
From the framework of Cooperation Theory outlined above, we formulate the
following expectations and hypotheses:
First of all, one would expect the EEM to better predict the actual outcomes
than the PEM. Indeed, Dijkstra et al. (2008; Table 1) found that the EEM
predictions have higher correlations with the actual outcomes than the PEM
predictions.
Second, we expect the number of actors preferring the PEM predictions to the
EEM predictions to be low, i.e., we expect the decision situation to have a PD
payoff structure for almost all actors. Moreover, as the number of issues in the16
set M increases, the number of exchange possibilities naturally increases as well.
Thus, the potential gains from exchange will generally increase in the number of
issues considered. However, if negative externalities are as important as we
argue they are, they should grow at a faster rate than the gains from exchange.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the number of actors preferring the PEM
predictions to the EEM predictions decreases as the number of issues
considered increases.
Third, if the decision situation is characterized by a PD payoff structure, there
should be no actors that consistently prefer the PEM predictions to the EEM
predictions. Note how according to Cooperation Theory, the sustainability of
cooperation hinges on the fact that actors who pursue their short-run self-interest
can be punished in the future. However, if an actor consistently prefers the PEM
over the EEM, punishment in this sense is not possible. To make precise
predictions of how strong this threat of punishment would have to be to induce an
actor to cooperate requires information about actors’ discount rates (i.e., the
degree to which they care about future outcomes). However, apart from the
obvious difficulties of estimating discount rates for countries, we simply do not
have this information available in the data set. Therefore, we formulate the
weaker hypothesis that on average no actor prefers the PEM over the EEM more
frequently than the other actors do. Thus, no actor is significantly less vulnerable
than others to the threat of refused cooperation.17
The first hypothesis was already tested in Dijkstra et al. (2008).. The second and
third hypothesis will be investigated in the following sections of the paper. Note
how these expectations derived from Cooperation Theory amount to specifying
conditions under which we expect one model (the EEM) to do better than another
(the PEM).
Data
The paper uses a large-scale EU data set collected by Thomson et al (2006).
The data are comprised of 162 controversial issues, which originate from 66
European Commission proposals, and which were discussed by the Council in
the period January 1999-December 2000. For both the PEM and the EEM, only
proposals containing at least 2 issues are relevant, since these models conceive
of decision making as a process of exchanges or outcome shifts on pairs of
issues. For this research, we identified 49 suitable proposals, containing a total of
137 issues. The actors involved in the decision process include the members of
the Council, which at the time included fifteen Member States, as well as the
European Commission and the European Parliament (Thomson and Stokman,
2006). All these actors were treated as unitary actors for the purposes of the
research. The Commission proposals were selected on the basis that they were
subject to either the Consultation or Co-decision rule and varied in terms of
whether Unanimity or Qualified majority was the relevant formal decision rule for
the Council of Ministers.18
For the selection of proposals and the collection of model-based data, 125
expert-based interviews were conducted. During these interviews, the experts
were asked to identify the controversial issues within each of the Commission
proposals. In this data, each proposal has at least two issues, while experts
identified a maximum of six issues for any one proposal. Each issue was defined
on a uni-dimensional, interval scale where the preferred policy outcome of each
actor for that issue could be placed.
Each actor’s preferred policy outcome is defined as the actor’s position on
that issue. The actors’ issue positions were standardized so that positions at 0
and 100 defined as the most extreme positions favoured by any of the actors. In
terms of missing data, on average 15.61 of the 17 actors took positions on each
of the 162 issues, where 33 of these issues were dichotomous (i.e. only two
possible positions) (Dijkstra et al, 2008).
The data set for this research includes a measure of each actor’s salience for
each issue. The measure of salience of an actor for an issue is the level of
importance that the actor attaches to the issue. An actor’s salience is ranked as a
score between 0 and 100. If an actor’s salience for an issue is rated at 0, this
means that the issue is of no importance at all, whereas a score of a 100 implies
that the issue is of the highest importance to that actor. The capability of an actor
is a measure of potential resources an actor can exert during the negotiations of
the issues in a proposal. In this research, the actors’ capabilities were estimated
using the Shapley Shubik Index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954).19
Results
In this research we explore the conditions, which can explain how the norm of co-
operation is so prevalent in EU decision-making. We focus on two contrasting
collective decision model scenarios. First, the PEM which captures an
‘unfettered’ exchange decision mechanism and second, the EEM which presents
a more ‘restricted’ collective decision mechanism taking account of the potential
for negative externalities. The EU data set is the same as in the earlier research
(e.g., Thomson 2006; Dijkstra et al. 2008) and is very appropriate for the current
paper because it covers a wide range of EU policy sectors and is an excellent
representative sample of EU Commission proposals. As in the earlier research,
the models are applied to each of the Commission proposals separately and it is
assumed that the collective decision negotiations are restricted to issues within
each proposal, so that no exchanges are permitted to take place across issues
from different proposal sets. This reflects the actual EU decision process where
each of the proposals was dealt with at different points in time (Dijkstra et al.
2008).
First let us begin by providing a descriptive break-down of the data used in
this decision analysis in terms of the (i) number of proposals that have 2, 3, …, 6
issues; (ii) numbers of proposals in different policy sectors; (iii) numbers of
proposals under different decision procedures.20
Table 1: Number of proposals having 2 -6 issues:
No of
Issues







In Table 1 we see that nearly half (49%) of the proposals had just two issues
and another approximately 32% of the proposals had no more than 3 issues.
This suggests that the complexity of the EU decision proposals in this data set,
as measured by the number of issues in the proposal set, is modest with just
under 19% of the proposals having 4 or more issues.
In Table 2, we examine the proportion of proposals, which belong to policy
sectors and which may be described as more or less “integrated”. Following
Lane and Mattila’s earlier research (1998), in our research we defined Agriculture
and the Internal Market as “more integrated” and all other policy sectors as “less
integrated”. Lane and Mattila’s ‘roll-call of votes research’ proposes that the
deeper the integration of the EU policy sector, the more difficult decision making
by unanimity.21






More (,00) 23 46,9
Less (1,00) 26 53,1
Total 49 100,0
In Table 3, while the spread of proposals is reasonably distributed across the
different procedures, Consultation (CNS) and Co-decision (COD, the majority of
the proposals under both these procedures use the Qualifiied Majority decision
rule (QMV) compared with the Unanimity decision rule (Unam).






QMV CNS 20 40,8
Unam CNS 9 18,4
QMV COD 16 32,7
Unam COD 4 8,2
Total 49 100,0
Now let us turn to the model based research results. To evaluate our
expectations, we first determined the predictions of the PEM and the EEM for
each issue. Subsequently, we computed for each member state the utility of the22
predictions of both of these models, according to equation (2) presented earlier
3.
Finally, we determined for each proposal separately which member states
preferred the PEM prediction to the EEM prediction, and dubbed them ‘winners’.
Thus, winners are member states that have higher utility under the PEM
predictions than under the EEM predictions. Two observations are in place here.
Firstly, note how for member states that are not winners (i.e., those that prefer
the EEM to the PEM), the proposal has a PD-like payoff structure: although
individual exchanges according to the PEM are profitable for them, they would be
worse off if all actors exchanged according to the PEM. Secondly, observe how
the set of winners may be different for different proposals (indeed, this is one of
our hypotheses).
In this research we found that the overall mean proportion of winners is 0.41. If
one assumes no missing data, this is calculated as an average of 6.56 out of 16
actors being a winner, i.e., preferring the PEM prediction to the EEM prediction.
This seems to be quite a large number, and it runs counter to our expectation
that the number of winners should generally be low. However as we saw earlier
in Table 1, there are a reasonably high proportion of the proposals under
analysis (49%) which have only 2 issues, which suggests that the tendency for
higher than expected number of winners is enhanced in these specific
circumstances.
3 We computed for each member state the utility of the predictions of both of these models, according to equation (2).
We did so for each proposal separately, so the symbol M in equation (2) refers to the set of issues belonging to a
particular proposal.23
Next, to evaluate our expectation, that the overall number of winners is
generally low and that it is decreasing as the number of issues per proposal
increases, we use standard linear regression modeling. Our dependent variable
is the proportion of member states per proposal that are classified as winners.
Member states having missing data on at least one of the issues in a proposal
were excluded from the analysis. We calculate the independent variable as the
number of issues per proposal minus 2. Since only proposals that contain at least
2 issues are included in the analysis, this variable has values from 0 to 4.
In the regression model, we find a constant coefficient of 0.472 (t47 = 11.45, p
< 001) and an expected negative coefficient for the number of issues per
proposal of -0.073 (t47 = -2.25, p = 0.029). As indicated by the high and
significant constant we see that there are sets of issues (proposals) in which not
every actor is strictly worse off in the situation where everybody exchanges
according to PEM. However, the significantly negative value of the parameter for
the variable counting the number of issues per proposal confirms our hypothesis
that individually rational exchanges (modelled by PEM) very quickly become
collectively irrational, due to negative externalities.
These regression results indicate that in a proposal containing 2 issues the
proportion of winners is about 0.47. Assuming no missing data, this would mean
that on average 7.55 out of 16 actors are classified as winners in proposals
containing 2 issues. However, for each additional issue the proportion of winners
decreases by approximately 0.07. Again assuming no missing data, this would
mean that for each additional issue the number of winners decreases by 1.17.24
In a second regression model we found in addition that the predictive
performance of the PEM (as measured by the model’s mean absolute error per
proposal) gets worse as the number of issues increases. These findings show for
instance, that for a proposal containing 2 issues, the mean absolute error of the
PEM is 19.77. This number increases by 3.98 (20% increase) with the first
additional issue. Moreover, in this second regression model, we controlled for the
decision procedure (see Table 3) and type of policy sector (see Table 2). Neither
of these control variables had a significant effect.
To evaluate our expectation that on average no actor is a winner more
frequently than the other actors, we determined the ‘winner distribution’ (i.e., the
count of how many times each actor is a winner across all proposals). The
results of our analysis of the “winner distribution” are presented in Table 4 below.
The results presented in Table 4 show that statistically all actors are a winner in
16.25 of the 49 proposals and that the winner distribution does not significantly
depart from uniformity (Chi-square = 15.82, df = 15, p = 0.3944). This concurs
with the earlier research findings of Thomson et al. (2006) which points to the
instability of actor alignments in the Council of Ministers.Table 4: Winner Distribution across all actors
Actor Aus Belg Den Com/EP Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux NL Por Sp Swe UK Total
Obs. 11 12 12 16 14 24 17 16 16 15 12 21 14 18 17 25 260
Exp. 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 260This result taken together with the Pareto inefficiency of the PEM helps
explain the existence of a cooperative norm in such a decision setting, where (i)
unfettered bilateral compromises (in the form of exchanges) have very large
social costs, and (ii) there is no consistent group of actors that would benefit from
insisting on bilateral compromise as the dominant mode of decision making. In
other words, the costs that would result from bilateral agreements would be
borne by all actors alike (or ‘in turn’). Moreover these results imply that the
shadow of the future is a real threat to these actors. The losses (from negative
externalities) are generally (when everybody exchanges) larger than gains (from
exchange and positive externalities), and no actor can evade future punishment,
since no actor is consistently a ‘winner’. In this regard, Arregui et al. (2006) have
shown, using the same EU data set as in this present research, that losses due
to negative externalities are indeed larger than gains, summed over all actors
and all proposals. Therefore, Cooperation Theory offers a plausible explanation
of the observed EU norm of cooperation.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper addresses the research problem of why Member States’
bargaining strategies seem guided by a strong norm of co-operation when
engaged in collective decision making in the EU Council of Ministers. Given their
very diverse sectoral and political interests, as well as contrasting resources, why
do member states behave in this co-operative manner? The present research27
makes use of a recent and very comprehensive data set of EU policy decisions in
the Council of Ministers. In this research we draw on Co-operation theory and
apply the insights from the Prisoner’s Dilemna Game to identify how the
configuration of members’ positions and interests makes it rational for individual
member states to comply with the norm of cooperation, since not doing so would
mean large forgone gains in the future. We apply two alternative collective
decision models, PEM and EEM, to identify the conditions for ‘unfettered’ or
‘restricted’ exchange bargaining in collective decision making in the EU Council
of Ministers.
The theory and research results presented in this paper suggest that the
predictive power of PEM should vary inversely with the average proportion of
‘winners’ in the data set. More winners implies that for actors the shadow of the
future becomes smaller, since there will be fewer occasions on which they will
actually be in a PD payoff structure. The results presented in this paper support
our hypotheses and contribute significant research insights to the analysis of the
core mechanism by which co-operative bargaining strategy dominates EU
decision processes in the Council of Ministers. Moreover the research presented
here yields a more general hypothesis concerning the conditions determining the
predictive power of the PEM and the EEM. Future forthcoming research in this
field will apply this analysis to a much larger and more varied decision data set to
test these general hypotheses.28
Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Exchange between actors A i and D j on issues 1 and 2. 1 O and
2 O indicate the expected outcomes on issues 1 and 2, respectively, before the
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